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CHIAPAS DIGEST #3 - February 1, 1994
Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy
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The Chiapas Digest synthesizes news from a wide range of sources
on the peasant uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. This issue contains
sections on New Devlopments, Responses (Mexico, internationally)
and Implications (political, economic). Comments, contributions and
subscription requests can be emailed to hholm@igc.apc.org, faxed to
(612)379-5982 or placed by telephone to (612) 379-5980.
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NEW DEVELOPMENTS
The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) and the Mexican
government's special negotiating commissioner, Manuel Camacho
Soli's, have exchanged a number of messages in the last two weeks.
On January 24, the EZLN proposed the initiation of negotiations on
four points: economic demands to address the "grave material
conditions of life" of Chiapan indigenous people; social demands to
address racism, marginalization, lack of respect, displacements, and
attacks on indigenous culture; political demands related to creating
real spaces "for Chiapan indigenous people and all Mexican people in
political life;" and an end to violent confrontations. They asked for
clarification of what type of recognition the government would give
them in order to know what guarantees they would have in both the
process of dialogue and compliance with the resulting accords. The
EZLN wants to be officially recognized as a belligerent force so that
its members will be protected by the rules of the Geneva Convention.
The EZLN promised not to disrupt the presidential elections in August
and offered to free former governor Absalo'n Castellanos Dominguez,
who they found guilty of "having obliged Chiapan indigenous people
to take up arms by closing off all possibilities of a peaceful solution
to their problems," in exchange for the release of EZLN combatants
and civilians held by federal troops. The EZLN also said it would like
to meet personally with Camacho and mediator Bishop Samuel Rui'z
Garcia, but that pressure from federal forces is an obstacle. The EZLN
statement added that sending messages is becoming more difficult
due to federal army efforts to wipe out the EZLN central command.
In response to the EZLN's question "Who should ask for forgiveness
and who can grant it?" in reference to President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari's amnesty bill, Camacho responded,
"This is a question that cannot be answered in any simple manner.
What is clear is that the government offers benefits through law
which contribute to reestablishing good fellowship and coexistence...
instead of simply talking of pardon, under the present conditions we
face a political decision about the most efficient way to attain peace
and leave behind abuses, violence, and marginalization and open up
processes to improve health, employment, and justice in Chiapan
communities which respect individual dignity and cultural
diversity..."
The amnesty bill was approved by Congress without modifications on
January 21, despite criticisms that it amounted to a call for
surrender. The amnesty applies to all persons seen to be involved in
the uprising from January 1 to 3:00 pm January 20, and is
conditioned on disarmament. Camacho indicated to the EZLN
command that, although the amnesty bill provided the legal
framework for a prisoner exchange, the required complete cessation
of hostilities for its application had still not been accomplished.
Camacho added, "it would be helpful if you would define new steps
which will bring a cease-fire as soon as possible."
Referring to accusations that the army has violated the unilateral
cease-fire declared by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari January 12,
Camacho said, "it is important to differentiate between an isolated
incident and a political decision in general." He added that he and
mediator Bishop Samuel Rui'z Garcia would make known their
detailed proposal for dialogue on January 28. The army responded
to complaints of human rights violations by announcing the
formation of an Office of Citizen Complaints and Attention in San
Cristo'bal de las Casas, in order to make "transparent the actions of
military personnel toward the civilian population..."
Besides directing messages to the EZLN, the Mexican government has
approached unarmed factions of Chiapan indigenous and peasant
society. President Salinas met last week with representatives from
280 independent peasant groups and heard complaints and demands
that the New York Times said "essentially repeated the insurgents'
calls for land redistribution and democratic reforms, aid to
impoverished families and an end to discrimination against the
Mayan Indians of the region." One speaker declared,
"We want to make it clear that the land problem is a problem that
has brought great persecution of peasant leaders, jailings and
assassinations that have been denounced without there ever being
any punishment or investigation of those responsible. If we do not
get the things we need, there cannot be peace."
"It is not true that those peasants have been manipulated by their
leaders," said Horacio Escobar of the Emiliano Zapata Proletarian
Organization, "We think their demands are just."
Salinas promised the organizations economic aid for the region, the
return of displaced families to their communities and to investigate
human rights violations. He offered no specific plans to deal with
problems of land distribution. The conflict zone has already been
targeted for increased economic aid, and Salinas decided January 20
to suspend taxes for periods between six months and a year for the
inhabitants of 21 municipalities in the highland, jungle and border
areas of Chiapas.
In other apparently conciliatory moves, the Chiapas interim governor
was replaced and the ruling Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRI)
agreed to electoral forms along with the two major opposition
parties. Elmar Setzer, like former governors, had been accused of
complicity in expelling indigenous people from their lands. His
replacement, Javier Lopez Moreno, immediately issued a state
amnesty bill to complement the national amnesty bill. In response to
demands by indigenous leaders, he said that he "will work in
accordance with the priorities" of the communities, but that he did
not agree with many of the demands the leaders put forth.
The PRI, the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) and the National
Action Party (PAN) all agreed to limit campaign spending to cap
campaign spending at US$44 million, down from a limit of $213
million agreed to on December 23, for the upcoming presidential
election. They also agreed to a plan for equal media access and
promised to "impede the use of public resources and programs in
favor of any political party or electoral campaign."
RESPONSES
-In Mexico-
PROCESO reports that, "although support for the tactic of taking up
arms is not growing, sympathy for the rebels is increasing among
young people, indigenous and rural sectors, part of the middle class,
the unemployed and those fed up with the impunity" afforded
violators of human rights.
Providing additional evidence of popular support for the uprising,
the Village Voice reports that "this past September, a number of
Indian and rural communities voted not to plant their fields, thereby
conciously deciding to go to war."
Nonetheless, others in Mexican society have expressed a less
benevolent attitude toward the rebels. In Ocosingo, 150 ranchers,
businessmen & landowners marched in the streets protesting that
they had "lost everything" and that they were "now in the power of
the Zapatistas without the government doing anything." The
PROCESO article reporting the march described the marchers as
"Ranchers denying they were 'caciques' (local political bosses) and
merchants denying they were price fixers." Fidel Vela'squez, head of
the official labor federation, at first recommended exterminating all
members of the EZLN, but later moderated his tone to support a
political solution.
Mexico's Center for Human Rights (CDH) has expressed skepticism
about prospects for negotiations.
"From our point of view, negotiations will soon confront a
fundamental issue: the contradiction between the authoritarian
official project that generates poverty in wide sectors of the
population and the social popular project that, with diverse
expressions and forms of struggle, has for years demanded a real
transition to democracy and towards a society where all rights
belong to all."
-Internationally-
The US State Department issued a statement in which it blamed the
uprising on "poverty and the lack of ability of the Mexican system -
government and everybody else - to deal with some of the
fundamental problems in that part of the world." Assistant Secretary
of State Alexander Watson added, "We need to work very hard with
our friends in the hemisphere to reduce poverty because it will be
regime-threatening over time." Despite EZLN statements calling the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a "death sentence
for indigenous people," State Department officials said the uprising
showed the importance of consolidating Mexico's free market
reforms.
Meanwhile, various organizations around the globe continue holding
actions and issue statements in defense of human rights for the
indigenous and peasant people of Chiapas. On January 27 a coalition
of human rights groups planned to ask the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
(OAS) to "protect the life and liberty of the civilian population in
Chiapas, Mexico, where the Mexican Army has been responsible for
executions, torture, disappearances and other human rights
violations in the aftermath of the armed rebellion..."
IMPLICATIONS
-Political-
Camacho's prominent role in attempts to peacefully resolve the
Chiapas uprising have given rise to speculation that he could
challenge current PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in
next August's elections. Camacho is considered more populist and
less committed to Salinas' economic program than Colosio, who has
marketed himself as the "candidate of continuity." Although
Camacho has complained that these types of speculations were
getting in the way of pursuing negotiations, he has not denied that he
may run. A statement by Salinas January 27 made it clear that any
such challenge by Camacho would not have his support.
The uprising, and the shadow it casts on current government policies,
could also benefit leftist PRD candidate Cuahtemoc Cardenas. If
Cardenas were to win, it would likely signify a major change in
Mexico's economic policies. Cardenas has strongly criticized such
central Salinas projects as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
Village Voice correspondent Marc Cooper notes that Camacho was
Colosio's primary rival for the PRI nomination, and describes the
PRI's current situation as delicate:
"If Camacho fails to negotiate a lasting peace, the PRI goes into the
election with a guerilla war at its back. On the other hand, to the
degree that Camacho is successful, Colosio is diminished. Worse for
the PRI is that Camacho might bolt and join up with Cardenas. Not
too far-fetched a scenario, given that Cardenas himself was a PRI
governor before founding his opposition Revolutionary Democratic
Party."
-Economic-
Economist Rogelio Ramirez de la O. said the Chiapas uprising "has
buried the long-held notion that in Mexico you can operate without
anesthesia." Ramirez contends that spending on social programs will
now have to take priority over balancing the budget.
The Mexican government's own economic goals for the year, ratified
January 20, show little consideration for the conflict. EL
FINANCIERO's Marcos Cha'vez M. commented that the government's
economic strategy, ratified January 20, has been presented "as if the
events in Chiapas had not occurred and as if it will be possible to
achieve the last segment of the economic stabilization policies
imposed in December, 1987." Cha'vez expressed doubt that "half the
population has the patience to listen to the official discourse,
according to which the recuperation of their living standard is not
imminent... in the best of cases, the recuperation of their[1980] living
standard will occur in 2000 or 2020..."
At the recent Davos World Economic Forum, Salinas downplayed the
revolt as a local problem caused by "armed radicals" and said he
would press on with his economic reform program. World Bank
officials said early in the conflict that the uprising would not affect
its lending plans for Mexico.
Locally, the militarization of the conflict zone and uncertainty about
future violence is causing problems for people that share many of
the frustrations that led EZLN members to take up arms. Coffee
grower Ricardo Perez Velasco said, "Now's the time to harvest, if we
can't get back soon, we'll lose the crop." At the same time, it may
bring government attention back to their seriously depressed sector.
About 300 small coffee growers met with the social development
ministry earlier this month to discuss renewed support.
According to David Myhre of the Center for US-Mexico Studies at the
University of California - San Diego, the failure of the International
Coffee Agreement in 1989 and the government's dismantling of the
Mexican Coffee Institute (Inmecafe) in 1991 caused coffee prices to
fall 40-45%. "This has really destabilized the Chiapan rural
economy," he said to the JOURNAL OF COMMERCE. In a separate
article for MEXICO INSIGHT, Myhre notes that peasants have begun
to construct input-buying cooperatives, credit unions and marketing
organizations in order to better compete in the global market, but
that,
"Unfortunately, the local and state governments have been unwilling
to support strongly such fledgling campesino enterprises... as a result,
many of the most innovative efforts to incubate campesino
enterprises have come to a grinding halt in the face of economic
liberalization."
Myhre contends, "Failure to reverse the decline of agriculture will
undermine any negotiated attempts to redress the other recognized
causes of the uprising."
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Sources (in order): "Plantea el EZLN Agenda de Cuatro Puntos Para
Iniciar Negociaciones," LA JORNADA, January 25, 1994; Text of Letter
Sent by Under-Commander Marcos to the Press on January 18, 1994;
CIRCULAR DE INFORMACION Y ANALISIS (XV) - CDH, January 26,
1994; Manuel Camacho Solis' Statements to the General Command of
the EZLN January 23&25,1994, printed in LA JORNADA; Charles
Wilbanks, "A Long Way to Go..." EL FINANCIERO - INTERNATIONAL,
January 24-30, 1994; SEDENA Press Bulletin, LA JORNADA, January
25, 1994; Tim Golden, "Mexico Leader, In Chiapas, Hears Peasants'
Wrath," NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1994; "No Pagara'n Impuestos
en 21 Municipios Chiapanecos," LA JORNADA, January 21, 1994; "New
Step Toward Peace: Resignation of Chiapas Interim Governor..." NY
TRANSFER NEWS, January 21, 1994; "Urgente, Que Se Vea la Accio'n
del Gobierno Para Dar Tranquilidad: Lo'pez Moreno," LA JORNADA,
January 25, 1994; Tim Golden, "Mexican Parties Agree to Reforms,"
NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1994; Oscar Camacho Guzma'n, "Trono'
la Consigna Porfirista: !Aca'benlos de Una Vez," LA JORNADA, January
22, 1994; Carlos Monsiva'is, "Dos Movimientos Paralelos: Simpati'a y
Resitencia," PROCESO, January 24, 1994; Marc Cooper, "The Mayan
Revolution: The Zapatistas Fire the Shot Heard 'Round the Global
Market," VILLAGE VOICE, February 1, 1994; "El Conflicto Chiapaneco,
Demasiado Para DonFidel," PROCESO, January 24, 1994; Sid Balman,
"US Says Mexican Government to Blame for Chiapas Revolt," UP,
January 25, 1994; John M. Goshko, "Balancing Trade Pact with Human
Rights in Mexico: Mayan Rebellion in Chiapas Could Bring Criticism of
Clinton Administration Policy," WASHINGTON POST, January 30,
1994; IACHR Press Release, January 27, 1994; Damian Fraser,
"Mexican Uprising Dents Colosio's Image," FINANCIAL TIMES, January
20, 1994; Damian Fraser, "Mexican Rebels Set Peace Conditions,"
FINANCIAL TIMES, January 26, 1994; "Mexican Ruling Pary Won't
Change Candidate- Salinas," REUTER,Jauary 28, 1998; Marc Cooper,
"The Mayan Revolution: The Zapatistas Fire the Shot Heard 'Round
the Global Market," VILLAGE VOICE, February 1, 1994; Juanita
Darling, Mexico: Revolt Puts Country's Economic Future on Hold," LA
TIMES, January 25, 1994; Marcos Cha'vez M., "Recuperacio'n Sin
Expectativas," EL FINANCIERO,January 20, 1994; "Salinas Says Mexico
Revolt Was a Local Problem," REUTER, January 29, 1994; "Mexico:
World Bank Loans Not Affected by Rebel Uprising," IPS, January 12,
1994; Kevin G. Hall, "Mexican Rebellion Imperils Coffee Harvest,"
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Jauary 20, 1994; Hall, "Small Coffee Farmers
View Aid as Key toEnding Mexican Unrest," JOURNAL OF COMMERCE,
January 22, 1994; Devid Myhre, "Revitalizing the Campesino
Economy," MEXICO INSIGHT, January 6, 1994.
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Produced by: Hannah Holm and Steven Suppan, Institute for
Agriculture & Trade Policy,1313 Fifth St. SE #303, Minneapolis, MN
55414, USA; tel: (612) 379-5980, fax: (612) 379-5982.
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