Porto Velho, June 15th, 1994
Dear Sirs,
Through this letter, we would like to inform the
directors of the World Bank of the existence of major
problems that are compromising the implementation of the
Rondonia Natural Resource Management Project (PLANAFLORO),
financed with a US$ 167 million Bank loan.
The Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations of Rondonia
is composed of non-profit organizations representing small
farmers, rubber-tappers and indigenous peoples, together with
environmentalists, educators, researchers and popular-support
organizations. Created in 1991, the Forum's principal
objectives are to democratize access to information and
ensure the participation of civil society and its
representatives in the definition and monitoring of public
policies. It also seeks to enhance the cooperation and
coordination of its members in joint activities. Since it was
created, one of the main activities of the Forum has been to
monitor PLANAFLORO.
During the 1980s, the World Bank financed the
POLONOROESTE program, the main objective of which was to
asphalt the BR-364 highway between Cuiaba' (Mato Grosso State)
and Porto Velho (Rondonia State). POLONOROESTE became well-
known internationally because of a series of problems that
worsened during its implementation, including a massive
influx of landless migrants, rising deforestation, the
failure of official colonization projects and the
agricultural model proposed by government agencies, invasions
of indigenous and other conservation units, land conflicts,
etc.
The main objective of PLANAFLORO is to promote a new
model of "sustainable development" in Rondonia, based on a
series of initiatives for the protection and management of
natural resources, including: socio-economic and ecological
zoning, promotion of agroforestry systems, recovery of
degraded lands, environmental protection and education, the
creation of Extractive Reserves and other conservation units,
forest management and support to indigenous communities.
During negotiations for PLANAFLORO, several non-
governmental organizations in Rondonia, with support from
national and international NGOs, raised questions about the
new program and its capacity to revert the serious problems
that accompanied the implementation of POLONOROESTE. One of
the main criticisms made by the NGOs was the lack of
participation of civil society, especially organizations
representing the program's intended beneficiaries (small
farmers, rubber-tappers and indigenous peoples), during the
elaboration of the original proposal for PLANAFLORO.
As a result of this mobilization, representatives of
twelve NGOs were invited to a meeting in June 1991 with
representatives of the State government and the World Bank.
After two days of negotiations, the Rondonia Government and
NGOs signed a "Protocol of Understanding" on June 20, 1991,
that established forms of participation by NGOs in the
planning, monitoring and evaluation of PLANAFLORO. At the
same time, the Rondonia Government promised to take a series
of emergency measures aimed at protecting the environment and
the territories occupied by traditional populations (Annex
01).
Despite the unquestionable validity of PLANAFLORO's
general proposals, its practical implementation, since first
disbursements were made by the World Bank in June 1993, has
been undermined by a series of problems that raise doubts
about the real commitment of government agencies to the
program; i.e. the "political sustainability" of PLANAFLORO.
In summary, the most serious problems that we have
observed during the implementation of PLANAFLORO include:
1) the inefficiency of the current system of project
planning, monitoring and evaluation, especially with regard
to guaranteeing the active participation of the beneficiaries
of PLANAFLORO;
2) the current policies of the Brazilian Institute of
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) in the creation of
settlement projects and land titling activities, which
disregard the socio-economic and ecological zoning
regulations and other environmental legislation;
3) the lack of legal and institutional measures, on the
part of the Government of Rondonia, to effectively implement
the socio-economic and ecological zoning plan and state
conservation units;
4) the existence of serious irregularities in the
demarcation of state conservation units, as contracted by the
Rondonia Land and Colonization Institute (ITERON), including
the illegal reduction of their borders;
5) the lack of coherence in the current system of
environmental licensing, in which authorizations for forest
clearing, burning and timber exploitation disregard the state
zoning regulations and environmental legislation, therefore
encouraging acts of environmental degradation, including the
illegal exploitation of timber in indigenous areas and other
conservation units.
6) the ineffectiveness of the present system of
environmental protection and enforcement, mainly due to
interventions by political and economic interests, resulting
in a situation of generalized impunity that encourages
illegal practices of environmental degradation.
7) the lack of concrete measures to implement the sub-
component "Support for Indigenous Communities" of PLANAFLORO,
with regard to activities of border demarcation and renewal,
isolated Indians, protection/enforcement and health.
8) the incompatibility of government investment programs
at the state and federal levels, including rural credit and
fiscal incentives, in relation to the objectives of
PLANAFLORO and the regulations of the socio-economic and
ecological zoning.
9) the lack of coherence among the current agricultural
policies of the Rondonia Government, especially in relation
to the proposals of PLANAFLORO for agroforestry development.
In contrast to the image that is promoted of PLANAFLORO,
as a "model" of popular participation in projects financed by
the World Bank, it is increasingly clear that the official
participation of NGOs in the project is mainly serving the
purpose of legitimizing the flow of financial resources
between the Bank and government agencies.
Considering the facts presented in this document,
including several cases of non-compliance with the
contractual agreements of PLANAFLORO, the NGO Forum of
Rondonia is calling upon the World Bank to suspend
disbursements for the project until concrete measures have
been taken by the government authorities and the Bank to
resolve the current impasse in its implementation.
Below, we present a summary of the main facts that
justify our request for a suspension in disbursements for
PLANAFLORO. We also present a list of emergency measures that
the NGO Forum of Rondonia considers a necessary condition for
the resumption of project disbursements.
1) Project Management and Popular Participation
The "Protocol of Understanding" signed in June 1991 by
the Rondonia government and various non-governmental
organizations guaranteed NGO participation in PLANAFLORO at
several levels, including: a) sectoral planning commissions
(Comisso~es Normativas de Programas - CNPs) that would serve
as technical bodies for the planning of activities within the
various project components and sub-components, b) activities
of project monitoring and evaluation, including an
"Independent Evaluation Committee", and c) a "State
Deliberative Council" (Conselho Deliberativo), the highest
decision-making body for the project at the state level
(Annex 01).
Three years after the signing of the agreement between
NGOs and the Rondonia Government, it may be stated that
PLANAFLORO still has no effective strategy for ensuring the
participation of NGOs (especially organizations that
represent intended beneficiaries) in the planning,
implementation and monitoring of project activities.
Planning
In the current system of project planning, the
participation of non-governmental organizations has been
limited to a superficial discussion of Annual Operating Plans
(POAs), basically lists of expenditures previously elaborated
in isolation by individual government agencies. In-depth
discussions with organized civil society have not yet taken
place regarding the conception and details of activities in
PLANAFLORO. Among the main organizations representing
PLANAFLORO's intended beneficiaries, there is a generalized
feeling that grassroots proposals are not being incorporated
into the process of project planning.
In addition to the problems already described, there are
other fundamental issues that have been neglected within the
current planning system of PLANAFLORO, including: a) the
needs to strengthen institutional capacity of executing
agencies, especially in terms of qualified personnel. To
cite just one example, no training has yet been carried out
with members of the sectoral planning commissions (CNPs) in
areas such as methods of strategic planning, sustainable
development and the aims and objectives of PLANAFLORO; b) the
institutional sustainability of PLANAFLORO, and the
continuity of its actions, once the program has been
completed; and c) reforms needed in existing government
policies to make these compatible with the aims of PLANAFLORO
and the socio-economic and ecological zoning regulations. In
the latter case, this document describes various examples of
the damage to PLANAFLORO caused by such a major omission in
the planning process.
Monitoring
In the current management model of PLANAFLORO, no
strategy yet exists for effectively monitoring project
implementation.
The objectives and aims listed in the great majority of
Annual Operating (POAs) are extremely vague, making it
difficult to effectively define indicators for monitoring
purposes. The monitoring reports, elaborated by executing
agencies and PLANAFLORO's Executive Secretariat
(SEPLANAFLORO), do not include sufficient information, in
both quantitative and qualitative terms, to allow a
discerning evaluation of the project's implementation. The
quarterly monitoring reports are organized by each executing
agency, without systematic reference to specific sub-
components and executive projects. In the current monitoring
system, there is no way of verifying the extent to which
implementation of project activities is compatible with the
planned actions within the POAs, nor the recommendations of
the sectoral planning commissions (CNPs), as approved by the
State Deliberative Council.
It is important to note that until the present, no
strategy has been defined to include the participation of
NGOs, especially those representative of project
beneficiaries, in the monitoring of PLANAFLORO.
Independent Evaluation Committee
Within the contractual agreements of PLANAFLORO, it was
envisaged that each year, the Government of Rondonia would
convene an "Independent Evaluation Committee", with the
participation of NGO representatives, to analyze the
implementation of reforms in environmental policies and other
regulations related to the program; the compatibility of
state and federal investment programs with the socio-economic
and ecological zoning regulations, and the performance of
individual project components.
The first Independent Evaluation Committee (COMAI) was
convened in September 1993. It included four government
representatives and four NGO representatives.(1)
In February 1994, in spite of quite precarious
logistical support, the Independent Evaluation Committee
presented a preliminary evaluation report that identified a
series of problems in the implementation of PLANAFLORO and
presented concrete suggestions for improving project
performance. Despite affirmations of agreement with the
evaluation report by the Executive Secretariat of PLANAFLORO,
nothing was effectively done to incorporate its suggestions.
On the contrary, the problems identified by the evaluation
report have become increasingly serious.
It should be noted that Independent Evaluation
Committee's final report has still not been submitted, due to
an absolute lack of logistical support from SEPLANAFLORO, as
well as the existence of political pressures to "soften" the
report's contents.
Deliberative Council
An important example of how popular participation has
been diluted in PLANAFLORO is the State Deliberative Council.
The occasional meetings of this council have the sole
objective of voting the approval of Annual Operating Plans
(POAs); thus legitimizing the influx of financial resources
into government agencies. The Council has never met to
discuss such topics as the quarterly project monitoring
reports, COMAI's evaluation report or the UNDP technical
cooperation program, as defined in the project's internal
statutes (Regimento Interno).
While the official institutions of PLANAFLORO that
include NGO participation are emptied of content, major
decisions related to the program are made in isolation by a
small group of high-level government officials. A recent
example of this phenomenon was the decision to demarcate
conservation units with irregular limits, reducing their
respective areas in order to accommodate political and
economic interests (see the section of this document on "Land
Tenure Policy, Zoning and Conservation Units").
We would like to emphasize the following additional
concerns, with regard to the administration of PLANAFLORO:
1) the political interference within executing agencies,
both at the state and federal levels, that has caused, in
addition to a high degree of turnover among managerial
personnel, deviations of public institutions from their
proper functions, impeding institutional coordination and the
compatibility of government policies within PLANAFLORO;
2) the use of PLANAFLORO funds, in 1993, to contract a
large number of employees by EMATER (Technical Assistance and
Rural Extension Enterprise), without observing technical
criteria for the hiring of personnel;
3) The lack of transparency in the operational
procedures of the Special Commission for Bidding of Public
Works and Services (CELOM);
4) the sluggishness of the state and federal
bureaucracies, which have caused a series of problems in the
implementation of PLANAFLORO. In this regard, it is worth
noting that the 1994 federal budget has still not been
approved by the Brazilian Congress.
Since the beginning of its participation in PLANAFLORO,
the NGO Forum of Rondonia has presented suggestions for
improving popular participation and the effectiveness of the
project's management model For example, after promoting a
seminar on "Civil Society and PLANAFLORO" in July 1993, the
Forum presented a proposal to the Executive Secretariat of
PLANAFLORO, with a strategy aimed at improving the project at
a technical level and broadening discussions within civil
society about its activities (Annex 2). The Executive
Secretariat of PLANAFLORO initially agreed with the proposal
presented by the Forum. However, it has done nothing to
guarantee its implementation.(2)
Finally, the World Bank's supervision missions in
Rondonia have maintained only sporadic contact with the non-
governmental organizations. During their visits to Rondonia,
Bank personnel have generally spent most of their time in
negotiations with individual executing agencies, in some
cases ignoring negotiations within the sectoral planning
commissions (CNPs) and riding roughshod over the jurisdiction
of the State Deliberative Council. Several problems
described in this report, such as the lack of compatibility
between government policies and the state zoning regulations,
have not received due attention by the Bank's supervision
missions.
2) Land Tenure Policy, Zoning and Conservation Units
Within the contractual agreements for PLANAFLORO, the
implementation of an institutional reform program was
envisaged to bring government policies and investments, both
public and private, into line with the socio-economic and
ecological zoning regulations and the project's conceptual
framework of sustainable development (see Section 2.14 of the
Project Agreement).(3)
The state socio-economic and ecological zoning plan,
initially established by State Decree no. 3.782 of June 14,
1988, was contemplated within the new State Constitution of
Rondonia in 1989, and later supported by Complementary Law
no. 52 of December 20, 1991.
Not withstanding the apparent "institutionalization" of
the socio-economic and ecological zoning regulations, the
policies and actions of various government agencies and
authorities in Rondonia have clashed with its guidelines and
with both state and federal environmental legislation.
One of the most serious examples of this problem has
been the land tenure policies of the National Institute for
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). In recent years,
the Regional Office of INCRA in Rondonia has blatantly
flouted the socio-economic and ecological zoning regulations
and other environmental legislation, in activities associated
with land expropriations, creation of settlement projects and
granting of land deeds on public lands.
Settlement Projects
In March 1992, INCRA created the Curupira, Rio do Conto
and Agua Azul Settlement Projects, with plans to settle 2,774
families in an area of approximately 215,000 hectares (Annex
03). These projects were located in areas with predominantly
poor soils in zone 4 (non-timber forest management, indicated
for creation of Extractive Reserves) according to the state
socio-economic and ecological zoning plan. The projects were
only suspended after a series of denunciations by the NGO
Forum of Rondonia to the President of INCRA.
Meanwhile, the Curupira, Rio do Conto and Agua Azul
Settlement Projects have still not been officially canceled
by INCRA. At the moment, local politicians are encouraging
the occupation of these areas by farmers, cattle ranchers and
land speculators, based on the argument that they have been
"liberated" by INCRA.
In 1993-1994, the Regional Superintendency of INCRA has
insisted upon the expropriation of four large landholdings
(named Rio Branco, Pedra do Abismo, Nova Vida and Oriente)
covering an area of 66,793 hectares between the "glebas" of
Capita~ o Silvio and Buriti', in the municipality of Campo Novo
(Annex 3). These properties (former "seringais" or rubber
estates) are also located within zone 4 (non-timber forest
extraction) in areas with a high incidence of poor and rocky
soils. Moreover, a recent field survey by FUNAI (National
Indian Foundation) discovered evidence of isolated Indians
within this region.
In the above-mentioned cases, as well as other recent
examples of land expropriations and acquisitions (see Annex
4), INCRA has both disregarded the state zoning regulations
and committed the following irregularities:
1) INCRA has not respected Resolution no. 001/86 of the
National Environmental Council (CONAMA), specifically article
no.2 paragraph XVII, which calls for the elaboration of an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Environmental
Impact Report (RIMA) prior to implementation of "agricultural
and livestock projects that involve areas over 1,000
hectares, or less, when concerning significant areas of
ecological importance, including areas of environmental
protection".
2) Similarly, INCRA has not carried out prior studies
to ascertain soil quality or human carrying capacity in areas
selected for small farmer settlement projects, nor has it
considered the impact of proposed projects on indigenous
populations, rubber tappers and other local inhabitants. In
several recent cases, INCRA has created settlement projects
bordering indigenous reserves and other conservation units.(4)
3) Proposals for land acquisitions and the creation of
settlement projects have not been duly submitted to the State
Commission on Socio-Economic and Ecological Zoning (created
by State Decree no. 5449 of January 16, 1992) of which INCRA
is a participant. This is a necessary procedure, considering
that the creation of settlement projects in the above-
mentioned areas would constitute a change in zoning category;
4) Proposals for expropriations of private properties
(for creation of settlement projects) have also not been
previously approved by the Rondonia State Land Commission,
contradicting Chapter II of its internal regulations and the
agreement signed by INCRA and the Government of Rondonia in
November 1992, concerning "Land Use Policies in the State of
Rondonia".
5) The definition of areas for the creation of
settlement projects by INCRA generally occurs without any
prior consultation with the main organizations representing
rural workers, rubber-tappers and indigenous populations.
In reality, the selection of properties for
expropriation and subsequent creation of settlement projects
is determined in negotiations between politicians, local
INCRA officials and land speculators. The latter purchase
large properties (generally former rubber estates in isolated
areas), which are then sold to the Federal Government at
inflated prices. INCRA then passes on the burden of repaying
overvalued land prices to the small farmers that are settled
in these areas.
Alienation of Public Lands
With regard to the alienation (granting of land titles)
on public lands, INCRA has blatantly flouted both Rondonia's
socio-economic-ecological zoning regulations and existing
state conservation units. During the period of 1990-1992,
INCRA granted titles to large land speculators and cattle
ranchers within the borders of existing state conservation
units, such as the Corumbiara and Serra dos Parecis State
Parks, as well as the Rio Sa o Domingos, Rio Mequens and Abuna
State Forest Reserves.. Such practices by INCRA-Rondonia are
in violation of the Federal Constitution and have rendered
practically inviable the establishment of several
conservation units, as planned within PLANAFLORO.
In granting title deeds to public lands, INCRA continues
to recognize indiscriminate deforestation, associated with
the introduction of artificial cattle pasture, as an
"improvement" for the purpose of legitimizing land claims.
This procedure, supported by an internal INCRA directive
(Normative Instruction No. 03 of September 8, 1992) has
benefited large land speculators and cattle ranchers at a
high cost in terms of social conflict and environmental
degradation. At the same time, INCRA has not recognized the
rational utilization of forest resources (such as the
extractive activities practiced by rubber-tappers) as a
criterion for legitimizing land occupation, nor the existence
of traditional communities (Indians, rubber tappers) in the
titling of large landholdings.
A recent example of INCRA-Rondonia's land titling
policies may be observed in the region of Gleba Buriti' (zone
4: non-timber forest extraction). During 1993, INCRA-
Rondonia granted land titles (Contratos de Promessa de Compra
e Venda - CPCVs) in areas claimed by land speculators and
cattle ranchers, based on massive illegal forest clearing and
the planting of artificial cattle pasture.
It should be noted that in the contractual agreements
for PLANAFLORO, one of the conditions for loan effectiveness
was the signing of an agreement between the Government of
Rondonia and INCRA "concerning land regularization policies
and practices to be observed in the State, which shall be
consistent with the objectives of sound forest protection and
management, on terms and conditions satisfactory to the
Bank".(Section 2.12 (a) of the Project Agreement and Section
6.01 (b) of the Loan Agreement).
To date, INCRA and the Government of Rondonia have
signed only a "Terms of Agreement" in November 1992, which
does not contemplate the need to make land titling policies
compatible with the state zoning regulations and the
sustainable management of natural resources, as envisaged in
the contractual agreements of PLANAFLORO. Meanwhile, the
actions of INCRA in Rondonia have blatantly flouted the loan
covenants of PLANAFLORO.
The experience of PLANAFLORO has demonstrated the
fundamental role of land tenure policy for the success (or
failure) of initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable
development in the Amazon region. In this regard, we believe
that INCRA has a potentially important contribution in
overcoming obstacles that are currently undermining the
implementation of PLANAFLORO.
Notwithstanding the problems encountered with INCRA at a
regional level, the NGO Forum of Rondonia has maintained
negotiations with the Institute at the presidential level.
For example, in March 1994, representatives of the Forum and
the President of INCRA signed a document that defined several
areas of cooperation with NGOs and the Government of
Rondonia, including: a) measures to avoid land concentration
and speculation within settlement projects and other existing
agricultural lands, as a means to promote agricultural
intensification by small farmers on more fertile soils; b)
land tenure regularization of Extractive Reserves and other
conservation units; c) revisions of internal INCRA
regulations, such as the recognition of indiscriminate
deforestation and introduction of artificial cattle pasture
as an "improvement" and criterion for granting title deeds to
large tracts of public lands (Annex 5).
The great majority of problems related to INCRA in
Rondonia may be explained by outside political interventions
within the Institute's regional office (Superintendency). In
Rondonia, as in other States, the head of INCRA's regional
office is selected by politicians, not by the Institute's
President. As such, it is not surprising that INCRA's
regional office in Rondonia has insisted on maintaining
traditional practices of catering to political and economic
interests, while refusing to recognize the social function of
the Institute and its potential contribution to sustainable
development.(5)
ITERON and Land Tenure Policy in Rondonia
The mistaken land tenure policies of INCRA also reflect
omissions of the Government of Rondonia with regard to
measures necessary to guarantee implementation of the socio-
economic and ecological zoning regulations and state
conservation units.
In 1988, the State Government created the Rondonia Land
and Colonization Institute (ITERON) (State Law no. 203 of June
20, 1988) which was delegated responsibility for the State's
land tenure policies. Within PLANAFLORO, ITERON has the
prime responsibility for implementation of the socio-economic
and ecological zoning regulations in Rondonia.
However, ITERON has not equipped itself with the
necessary instruments to assume effective management of the
state's public lands. To date, ITERON has not presented
technical proposals to INCRA, justifying the transfer of
federal lands to the state domain, as required by federal
legislation (Decree no. 2375 of November 24, 1987). In other
words, ITERON is a land institute without lands, which makes
its very existence questionable.
In cases of land expropriations for the purpose of
establishing conservation units or other measures envisaged
by the state zoning regulations, effective cooperation
between INCRA and ITERON is indispensable. However, as has
been noted above, INCRA and the Government of Rondonia have
yet to sign an agreement along the lines stipulated by
contractual agreements of PLANAFLORO.
It should be observed that Complementary Law no. 52 of
December 29, 1991, governing the socio-economic and
ecological zoning of Rondonia, stated that enabling
regulations (regulamenta<a~o) should be issued by the State
Executive within a period of 60 days (article 7). However,
due to a lack of interest on the part of the Government of
Rondonia, regulations were only enacted in March 1994
(through Decree no. 6316 of March 2, 1994), more than two
years behind schedule.
More importantly, Decree no. 6316 does not effectively
contribute to needed regulations for the state zoning law,
principally with regard to guidelines for natural resource
management within specific zones and measures for the
implementation of state conservation units. Moreover, the
decree does not include a description of the boundaries of
the various zones, including geographical coordinates, as
required by article no. 3 of Complementary Law no. 52.
On the contrary, Decree no. 6316, elaborated in isolation
by ITERON, limited itself to a sparse and imprecise repetition
of what had already been set out in Complementary Law no. 52.
A draft version of the decree were not previously submitted
for approval to the State Commission for Socio-Economic and
Ecological Zoning, contravening article 1, paragraph IV of
Decree no. 5.449 of January 16, 1992. All evidence would
suggest that the issuing of this decree on the state zoning
plan, in the manner carried out by the Government of
Rondonia, represented nothing more than a maneuver to please
the World Bank (in "for the English to see" style). Such an
attitude, on the part of the Government of Rondonia, once
more undermines the efficiency of socio-economic and
ecological zoning policy as an instrument of regional
planning.
In conclusion, it should be noted that despite its legal
attributes as "guardian" of the state zoning plan in
Rondonia, we are unaware of a single case in which ITERON has
questioned the constant disregard for the socio-economic and
ecological zoning, on the part of government agencies such as
INCRA.
State Conservation Units
During the period of 1989-1991, the Government of
Rondonia created a series of state conservation units (State
Parks, Biological Reserves, Ecological Stations, "State
Extractive Forests" and "State Forests for Sustained-Yield")
in areas corresponding to zones 4, 5 and 6 of the state
zoning plan.
However, the Government of Rondonia has not taken the
necessary legal and institutional steps to guarantee the
effective implementation of these conservation units,
especially with regard to procedures for land tenure
regularization. In some cases, the creation of state
conservation units requires the definition of new legal
instruments, as in the example of "State Forests for
Sustained Yield" (timber management). Unfortunately, the
Government of Rondonia has not yet taken any coherent
measures in this regard.
The decrees that created the "State Extractive Forests"
and the "State Forests for Sustained Yields" merely state
that lands within their perimeters "may be declared to be of
public interest if management guidelines are not respected in
the socio-economic and ecological zoning plan of Rondonia".(6)
In the case of "State Extractive Forests", this deliberate
ambiguity contrasts with Federal legislation on Extractive
Reserves (Federal Decree no. 98.897 of January 30, 1990) that
clearly defines procedures for land tenure regularization and
resource use concessions to local communities.
Recently, ITERON has contracted private companies, using
World Bank-disbursed funds, to carry out the demarcation of
various conservation units. However, these demarcations
present a series of irregularities:
1) The demarcations contracted by ITERON do not
correspond to the original borders of various state
conservation units, as defined in the decrees which created
them. For example, the demarcation of the Corumbiara and
Guajara'-Mirim State Parks exclude significant portions of the
originally-designated areas.
In the case of the Corumbiara State Park, established by
Decree no. 4576 of March 23, 1990, the exclusion of
approximately 150,000 hectares by ITERON has the objective of
attending to interests of large cattle ranchers and land
speculators. Many of these people were benefited with land
titles granted irregularly by INCRA during 1991-1992, i.e.
after the creation of the State Park. At the moment,
deforestation and land speculation inside the Park proceed at
an accelerated rate, encouraged by the neglect and collusion
of INCRA and ITERON.
In the Guajara'-Mirim State Park, established by Decree
no. 4575 of March 23, 1990, ITERON is promoting the
demarcation of an area that excludes a significant part of
the Park, including a mountainous region characterized by a
fragile ecosystem. According to ITERON, the exclusion of this
area is due to the prior existence of old rubber estates
(seringais) with definitive land titles, which the Government
of Rondonia has no way of expropriating . (In reality, the
area excluded by the current demarcation includes public
lands in the north of the Park).
In fact, the reduction of the Guajara'-Mirim State Park
has the strategic function of facilitating the opening of the
RO-421 highway between the towns of Vila Nova do Mamore' (on
the border with Bolivia) and Ariquemes (on the BR-364
highway) thus permitting access to an isolated region by
logging companies, cattle ranchers, land speculators, and
others (Annex 03).
Such procedures by ITERON encounter serious legal
impediments. For example, article 225 of the Federal
Constitution states that "Public Authorities shall define, in
all units (States and Federal Territories) of the Federation,
territorial spaces and their components that should be
specially protected. Any alteration or suppression of such
areas shall be permitted only by law, prohibiting any
utilization that compromises the integrity of the attributes
that justify their protection." (7)
Formally, the alteration or suppression of any state
conservation unit requires prior approval by the State
Commission for Socio-Economic and Ecological Zoning, as well
as the State Legislative Assembly. Unfortunately, these
legal procedures have not been respected by ITERON.
In addition, it should be observed that Section 2.10 of
the Project Agreement for PLANAFLORO includes the Guajara-
Mirim and Corumbiara State Parks among the state conservation
units to be maintained by the Government of Rondonia.
2) ITERON is promoting the demarcation of several
conservation units where necessary measures for land
regularization have not been carried out. In these cases,
legitimate landowners may take legal measures to suspend
demarcations. This situation occurs in such areas such as the
Rio Ouro Preto Extractive Reserve and the Rio Pacaas Novos
State Extractive Forest.
3) ITERON is contracting the demarcation of state
conservation units, without previously arranging for the
transfer of Federal public lands to the State's domain, as
required by federal legislation (Decree no. 2.375/87). Some
examples of this situation include: the Rio Pacaas Novos
State Extractive Forest, the Corumbiara State Park, the
Guajara'-Mirim State Park; and the Tra<adal State Biological
Reserve.(8)
4) ITERON has contracted the demarcation of various
"Extractive Reserves" that simply do not exist. For example,
the Rio Cautario, Curralinho, and Baixo Sao Miguel Reserves
have not yet been established by decree. As such, the demarcations
will have no legal effect. At least in the case of the Rio
Cautario, this situation is the result of opposition by local
elites, associated with timber exploitation and cattle
ranching, that do not accept the creation of Extractive
Reserves.
In summary, it may be concluded that the situation
described above demonstrates a convergence of factors: a)
the land tenure policies of INCRA, that have disregarded the
zoning plan and the state conservation units; b) the
omissions of ITERON and the negligence of the Government of
Rondonia, in failing to take legal and institutional measures
to effectively implement the state conservation units; c) the
concerns of the Government of Rondonia to spend money and
demonstrate actions to the World Bank, within the
environmental component of PLANAFLORO, as a response to the
Bank's policy of maintaining a "pari-passu" in the
disbursements for the various project components.
Second Approximation of the Socio-Economic and Ecological
Zoning
In contrast to the World Bank's Staff Appraisal Report,
the Terms of Reference for the second approximation of the
zoning plan, prepared under the coordination of ITERON,
propose studies that will represent a generalized "sweeping"
of the entire territorial area of Rondonia, including
indigenous areas and other conservation units. While there
persists an absence of government policies to guarantee the
conservation and sustainable management of natural resources
in Rondonia, the implementation of in-depth surveys on stocks
of natural resources (minerals, soils, timber, etc.),
especially within conservation units, could have the effect
of encouraging environmental degradation and intensified
social conflict (for example, the illegal exploitation of
timber and mining within indigenous areas).
Without the implementation of the institutional reforms
envisaged in PLANAFLORO, and while disregard persists among
governmental agencies in relation to the state zoning
regulations and environmental legislation, it is highly
questionable whether the implementation of studies for the
second approximation of the zoning plan can be justified.
3) Environmental Licensing and Protection
In the area of environmental licensing and protection,
there are various examples of government policies that
undermine the socio-economic and ecological zoning plan and
the objectives of PLANAFLORO.
For example, the State Secretariat for Environmental
Development (SEDAM) has unduly recognized "declarations of
occupation" (declara<o~es de posse), irregularly issued by
INCRA, as a basis for granting authorizations for forest
clearing and burning, as well as approval of plans for
"selective felling" (removal of wood in areas to be clear-
cut) within areas of restricted use, in zones 4 (non-timber
forest extraction) and 5 (sustained forest management). This
procedure was only recently discontinued.
Moreover, the State Superintendent of IBAMA (the
Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources) has used such irregular land documents issued by
INCRA to approve "management plans" (basically plans for
tree-felling that lack technical sustainability) which allow
removal of timber within legal forest reserves on private
properties (Service Order no.005/94/GAB/SUPES/RO of February
10, 1994).
In general terms, the approval of such management plans
by IBAMA-Rondonia has not taken into consideration the socio-
economic and ecological zoning regulations. For example,
IBAMA generally approves large timber exploitation projects
which are located in areas of restricted use, according to
the zoning plan, and in disregard to other legal
restrictions.(9) It should be emphasized that in such cases,
logging companies are further awarded with fiscal incentives,
including exemptions from an "Industrialized Products Tax"
(IPI) awarded by SUFRAMA (Superintendency for the Manaus
Free-Trade Zone).
Based on Service Instruction no. 001/94/SUPES/RO of
February 9, 1994, the State Superintendent of IBAMA in
Rondonia also permits authorizations for forest clearing and
"selective felling" without reference to the state zoning
plan. In this manner, IBAMA has already approved various
"selective felling" projects (allowing for clear cutting of
50% of private properties) within zones 4 and 5.
Based on authorizations for forest clearing and timber
exploitation, IBAMA has granted " Authorizations for the
Transport of Forestry Products" (ATPFs), that legalize the
transportation of logs to local sawmills.
In reality, all of this documentation, issued by SEDAM
and IBAMA, is deliberately used to disguise the illegal
removal of a huge volume of timber from vast areas,
principally indigenous reserves and other conservation units.
In other words, the policies of government agencies
responsible for environmental protection in Rondonia have an
inverse function: i.e. to facilitate environmental
degradation.
Currently, indiscriminate deforestation on large estates
and public lands simply invaded for speculative purposes
(along with the uncurbed theft of timber) typically go
unpunished, as a result of the traffic of influence within
government agencies such as IBAMA and SEDAM. This situation
is easily observable in locations such as Chupinguaia,
Cerejeiras, Costa Marques and Gleba Buriti'.
The efficacy of actions in enforcement and environmental
protection is further limited by the following factors: a)
the underutilization of remote sensing images, available at
SEDAM, for inspection purposes; b) the lack of field
inspections in areas where authorizations for deforestation
and timber exploitation have been granted; c) the distance
maintained by the State Public Ministry in relation to
environmental problems; the lack of police investigations
into environmental crimes; and the failure to impose fines
for environmental offenses.
The forms used by SEDAM and IBAMA to grant
authorizations for deforestation and timber exploitation do
not register such basic information as the specific location
and legal status of private properties, nor their
relationship to the state zoning plan and existing
conservation units. These omissions have facilitated the
granting of authorizations for deforestation and timber
exploitation within conservation units and in areas of
restricted use, according to state zoning regulations.
According to the Brazilian Forestry Code (articles 19
and 21 of Law no. 4771/65), the removal of timber from primary
forests must be accompanied by reforestation. However, this
subject has been completely neglected by the public
authorities. The funds that IBAMA has collected from the
timber industry for reforestation have never been applied
within the region. On the contrary, only a small portion of
these resources has been invested in reforestation programs,
principally for the planting of pine and eucalyptus
plantations in the Center-South region of Brazil. According
to SEDAM estimates, the State of Rondonia fails to receive
approximately US$ 7,500,000 annually in taxes collected by
IBAMA for reforestation.
At the same time, government agencies have invested very
little in trying to identify models that might demonstrate,
to timber companies and landowners, the technical and
economic viability of systems for native forest management
and reforestation. The absence of alternative models for
sustainable management of timber resources has made efforts
in forest protection and enforcement more difficult.
Finally, we emphasize that activities in environmental
protection and enforcement have been rendered practically
inviable, as a result of the failure of IBAMA, SEDAM and the
Forestry Police to sign cooperative agreements, as envisaged
within PLANAFLORO's official documents.
4) Support to Indigenous Communities
The main aim of the sub-component "Support for
Indigenous Communities" of PLANAFLORO is to safeguard the
physical and cultural integrity of indigenous peoples in
Rondonia, together with their territories and natural
resources. However, during this initial phase of project
implementation, the following problems have been identified.
Demarcation and Boundary Renewal
During the first year of PLANAFLORO, demarcations of
five indigenous areas considered to be priorities (Sagarana,
Rio Guapore', Rio Mequens, Karipuna and Massaco) were not
carried out. None of the planned activities for boundary
renewal in 1993 were implemented, although the majority of
these indigenous areas have been invaded by logging
companies.
Enforcement
With respect to inspection and enforcement, the main
problem has been the lack of institutional integration
between FUNAI, IBAMA, SEDAM, the Forest Battalion of the
Military Police and the NGOs. With the exception of a few
areas in the region of Guajara-Mirim, indigenous reserves in
Rondonia have suffered invasions by logging companies, land-
grabbers and prospectors. The current situation is becoming
more acute due to the non-functioning of state and federal
agencies, principally FUNAI and IBAMA, that have done very
little to guarantee the physical and cultural integrity of
these communities, thus contributing to their social
disintegration.
Isolated Indians
None of the operations envisaged in the 1993 Annual
Operating Plan (POA) were implemented. FUNAI has not sought
to strengthen the team engaged in contacting isolated
Indians. Meanwhile senior FUNAI officials deny the existence
of isolated Indians, despite the evidence produced by field
surveys.
Of particular concern is the region of RO-421 and Gleba
Buriti. Powerful interests support the completion of the RO-
421 highway between the towns of Vila Nova do Mamore' and
Ariquemes in order to permit exploitation of natural
resources, based on logging, cattle ranching and land
speculation. This situation is urgent and demands a rapid
response from FUNAI, given that field reports prepared by its
own staff discovered invasions by timber companies in areas
inhabited by isolated Indians. The interdiction of this area
would require only an administrative decision by FUNAI, given
its location on public lands, thus not affecting private
properties.
Health
Within PLANAFLORO, the preparation of an "Indigenous
Health Program" for the State of Rondonia was envisaged. An
agreement between FUNAI and the State Health Secretariat
(SESAU), signed in 1992, was aimed at ensuring integrated
health services for the indigenous population. The activities
carried out under the agreement were to be supervised by a
State Commission on Indigenous Health. However, the program
was not elaborated, nor was the commission organized,
resulting in a lack of coherent planning in this regard.
The indigenous health project of PLANAFLORO includes
plans for the constitution of five mobile health teams,
supplies for basic pharmacies in indigenous villages,
contracting of public health consultants and medical
anthropologists, retraining of field personnel and the
training of health monitors selected within the community
themselves. Unfortunately, almost nothing has been
implemented to date in this regard.
Economic Alternatives
Despite the potential importance of alternative
production projects within indigenous areas, the elaboration
of such projects within PLANAFLORO has been promoted by
FUNAI and SEPLANAFLORO in a questionable manner. Currently,
projects are drafted by FUNAI and EMATER technical staff,
without an analysis of viability and sustainability, in
economic, cultural and environmental terms, and without
taking into consideration traditional forms of production
among indigenous communities. Moreover, the projects are not
submitted for analysis to the sectoral planning commission
(CNP) on indigenous affairs within PLANAFLORO. Given the
manner in which these projects are being prepared, there is a
serious risk of causing more damage than benefits among
indigenous communities.
It should also be emphasized that there are deficiencies
in the distribution and technical capacity of FUNAI's staff,
which constitute a limiting factor in meeting the health
needs of indigenous communities, as well as ensuring regular
and effective monitoring of indigenous reserves.
In addition to the operational problems mentioned above,
there are institutional obstacles that impede FUNAI from
effectively coordinating government policies with regard to
indigenous affairs in Rondonia. Currently, local offices of
FUNAI in Rondonia do not possess administrative capacity to
implement PLANAFLORO. This limitation is due to the lack of
autonomy at the level of FUNAI's "Regional Administrations
(ADRs)", which are unable to issue service orders for the
demarcation, interdiction and boundary renewal of indigenous
areas. The excessively hierarchical structure of FUNAI in
Brasilia, as well as the absence of a qualified
representative in Rondonia to coordinate the implementation
of PLANAFLORO, have further hindered the implementation of
this sub-component of PLANAFLORO.
5) Agroforestry Development
The basic objective of the "Agroforestry Development"
component of PLANAFLORO to promote alternatives to current
agricultural and livestock practices in the State of
Rondonia, through a strategy based on the promotion of
agroforestry systems among small-farmers.
However, the main initiatives of the Government of
Rondonia in the agricultural sector have frequently
demonstrated a lack of reference to the instruments and basic
concepts of sustainable development. Currently, the State
Agricultural Secretariat (SEAGRI) intends to establish a
major program of "Strategic Poles For Agricultural, Livestock
and Forestry Production". SEAGRI's plan presents a series of
contradictions with PLANAFLORO and was not based on previous
viability studies, in terms of agroecological sustainability,
market analysis and adaptability among small-farmers.
The lack of consistent policies within the agricultural
sector has made it difficult to integrate the activities of
research, technical assistance, rural credit and input supply
in Rondonia. Such institutional integration is further
hindered by conflicts between executing agencies such as
CEPLAC and EMATER, regarding jurisdiction for activities in
technical assistance and rural extension.
During the first year of PLANAFLORO, there was no
effective strategy for guaranteeing the active participation
of smallholders and their organizations in the planning,
implementation and monitoring of project activities. In part,
the conflicts between governmental agencies, described above,
reflect the lack of a more consistent dialogue with the
representative organizations of smallholders.
Within the "Agroforestry Development" component of
PLANAFLORO, almost exclusive emphasis was placed on the
promotion of cash crops, with insufficient concern for the
integrated management of natural resources on farmers'
properties, including needs for subsistence production.
Within the rural credit sub-component, the investments
of FUNDAGRO have demonstrated the following problems: a) The
establishment of agroforestry systems received only 11% of
investments in 1993; b) The number of producers that received
assistance in 1993 was less than 50 per cent of the target
for Year 01 of PLANAFLORO; c) the application of FUNDAGRO
funds has been concentrated in some municipalities (such as
Cacoal, Ouro Preto, Jar, Vilhena, Rolim de Moura and Alvorada
d'Oeste) apparently for political motives. In the preparation
of FUNDAGRO rural credit projects, EMATER has ignored the
existence of various associations and trade unions, while
creating new organizations that can be politically
manipulated.
In addition, there are other rural credit programs
(mainly the Federal government's Northern Constitutional Fund
- FNO) which invest much larger sums of financial resources
and that have other priorities, particularly extensive
cattle-ranching. It is worth observing a recent case, in
which the Superintendency for the Development of the Amazon
(SUDAM) approved subsidized financing through FNO for a large
livestock project, to be located on a cattle ranch
irregularly titled by INCRA within the borders of a
previously-established state conservation unit (to be
protected and managed through PLANAFLORO). The approval of
the credit project by SUDAM responded to a special request
from the Vice-Governor of Rondonia (the signatory of the
PLANAFLORO contractual agreements). (Official letter no.
324/GAB/GVG of November 18, 1993; SUDAM case no.
001958/93).(10)
6) Socio-Economic Infrastructure
Road transport
During 1993, the Rondonia Highway Department (DER-RO)
published a state road map that displayed several planned
roads that would be inconsistent with the state zoning plan
and the existence of several conservation units. When
questioned, DER-RO claimed that the map, widely distributed
in Rondonia, was based on an old government road plan. The
Government of Rondonia was to have presented a new State Road
Plan in March 1994, that would respect the zoning boundaries
and conservation units. However, this map has still not been
published.
The supervision of investments in road transport has
been impeded by a lack of basic data within monitoring
reports, regarding the identification of roads constructed or
rehabilitated with PLANAFLORO funds. Moreover, there is
evidence (requiring verification) that the location of road
construction and rehabilitation works has been unduly
influenced by political and economic interests.
Energy
Currently, ELETRONORTE is planning to construct the Ji-
Parana' Hydroelectric Plant in Rondonia, with 512 MW capacity
and investments of US$ 780 million (over three times the cost
of PLANAFLORO). The construction of the plant is scheduled to
begin in 1995, with an estimated completion date of March
2003. The Ji-Parana' dam will flood an immense area of forest
along the Rio Ji-Parana, including portions of the Jaru'
Biological Reserve and the Lourdes Indigenous Area, as well
as the lands of approximately 5,000 small farmer families.
Health
Within this sub-component of PLANAFLORO, some basic
problems have included: a) delays in the flow of financial
resources to executing agencies; b) a lack of institutional
articulation among executing agencies; c) an excessive
centralization of government actions; d) the government model
of healthcare, that undervalues the importance of preventive
medicine; e) the existence of a staff that lacks motivation
and technical qualifications.
Education
Within this sub-component, serious problems have been
detected, including: a) deficiencies in the centralized
system of planning and elaboration of POAs, that have not
allowed effective demands in the area of education to be
addressed; b) the undervaluing of educational professions and
the absence of an adequate training program for teaching
personnel; c) the need for more effective participation
among local communities and municipal education departments,
in the various phases of planning, implementation and
monitoring; d) the lack of an adequate understanding, among
the staff of the State Secretariat of Education (SEDUC) with
regard to the aims and objectives of PLANAFLORO; e) the
deterioration of infrastructure and loss of qualified staff
at the municipal level; and f) the existence of deficiencies
in the current system of school supervision.
Conclusions
Undoubtedly, PLANAFLORO has the potential to make a
significant contribution to efforts promoting a new model of
"sustainable development" in Rondonia. In this regard,
PLANAFLORO represents an opportunity to learn from the
difficult experience of the POLONOROESTE project during the
1980s, the implementation of which the World Bank itself
recognized as a failure.
However, the effective implementation of PLANAFLORO
depends upon significant changes in relations between the
government, business interests, civil society and the
environment. These changes must include the democratization
of the State and the strengthening of government partnerships
with organized sectors of civil society, in the search for
regional development strategies based on the sustainable
management of renewable natural resources (in the medium and
long terms), the reduction of socio-economic inequalities and
respect for cultural diversity.
After one year of implementation of PLANAFLORO, we
conclude that the program is being undermined by the
following basic problems:
1) First, there are difficulties inherent to attempts to
implement any program with the breadth and complexity of
PLANAFLORO, in terms of the technical and administrative
capacity of the State (especially with respect to qualified
personnel). This problem has been aggravated by the prolonged
economic crisis in Brazil, together with neo-liberal policies
that have contributed to a severe deterioration of the public
sector.
2) Other external factors, over which the coordinators
of PLANAFLORO and the Government of Rondonia exercise little
or no control, have also prejudiced the implementation of the
program. One important example is the lethargic disbursement
of PLANAFLORO resources by the Federal government. (Once
again, it is worth noting that the 1994 Federal budget has
still not been approved by Brazilian Congress).
3) Despite the seriousness of the problems outlined
above, PLANAFLORO is being adversely affected by a problem
that we consider to be even more serious: the lack of
political commitment to the program, on the part of the
Government of Rondonia and federal government agencies.
As described in this report, the normative proposals of
PLANAFLORO (such as the need for government policies to be
compatible with the socio-economic and ecological zoning
plan) have met strong resistance from political and economic
elites in Rondonia. These vested interests consider
themselves prejudiced by the state zoning plan and other
normative measures associated with PLANAFLORO, especially
when these affect their privileged access to land and other
natural resources, opportunities for high short-term profits
through practices that result in environmental degradation,
and the capturing of financial subsidies from the public
sector to carry out such activities.
This document presents various examples of government
policies that conflict with the guidelines of the state
zoning plan and the conceptual framework of sustainable
development that is the basis of PLANAFLORO (in such areas as
land tenure policy, environmental licensing, rural credit,
etc.) (11) At the same time, we have described the omission
and collusion of government agencies responsible for enforcement
and environmental protection, when confronted with pressures
from timber companies, cattle ranchers, land speculators and
their political allies.
The persistence of conflicting government policies, of
institutional conflicts between executing agencies, of
instability and political intervention in the appointments of
senior staff to federal and state agencies, and the
generalized deviation of government agencies from their
proper functions all reveal an extremely worrying picture,
with respect to the real possibilities for implementation of
PLANAFLORO.
Another example of the precarious political support for
PLANAFLORO may be found in statements made by politicians and
senior officials of the program's executing agencies. The
following arguments are typically heard: 1) the socio-
economic and ecological zoning plan of Rondonia is a "strait-
jacket" which is preventing the development of the State; 2)
The state zoning plan and environmental concerns are all
impositions by the World Bank, and 3) PLANAFLORO represents
"very little money" in exchange for the government and
businessmen to have to give up "developing" the State.
With regard to such declarations, the NGO Forum of
Rondonia would like to make clear the following point of
view:
1) In the first place, it should be recognized that
there were errors in the first version of the socio-economic
and ecological zoning plan, in which some existing
occupations were not taken into consideration. Some examples
of this problem include: a) a strip of lands previously
demarcated by INCRA along the RO-429 highway (Presidente
Medici-Costa Marques), that was classified as zone 4 (non-
timber forest extraction); b) the region of Rio Sa~ o Pedro
(Gleba Corumbiara) which was included in zone 2 (agriculture
and livestock), despite its traditional occupation by rubber-
tappers. Similarly, other normative policies with regard to
the environment need to be perfected as well.
2) However, the existence of errors in the first version
of the state zoning plan does not invalidate its contribution
as an instrument of regional planning. As such, there is a
need to perfect the state zoning plan (and eventually other
normative policies), based on technical criteria and a
balancing of social, economic and environmental concerns.
3) The great majority of criticisms levelled at the
socio-economic and ecological zoning plan and other
environmental, policies, on the part of politicians and
senior officials of government agencies, have the main
objetive of demoralizing these proposals. This situation may
be largely explained by the fact that these measures
interferes with the immediate interests of land speculators,
cattle ranchers, timber companies, and others (in other
words, the capacity of regional elites to act freely, with
the omission and collusion of the State).
In brief, the lack of commitment among government
agencies, with regard to implementation of the socio-economic
and ecological zoning plan and other environmental policies,
is evident at several levels: a) in the deliberate ambiguity
of the state legislation on zoning and conservation units; b)
in the non-functioning of relevant institutions, such as the
sectoral planning commissions (CNPs), the State Commission
for Socio-Economic and Ecological Zoning and the State Land
Commission (in which NGOs officially participate); c) in the
persistence of mistaken public policies (especially in
relation to land tenure, the agricultural sector, and the
environment); d) in the omission and collusion of government
agencies responsible for enforcement and environmental
protection, vis-'a -vis innumerable acts of environmental
degradation.
In the present context, we have arrived at the
unpleasant conclusion that the main concern among government
agencies in Rondonia, with regard to PLANAFLORO, is not the
implementation of the program's objectives, but rather to
ensure an influx of external financial resources for
"institutional strengthening" of the State bureaucracy.
As such, PLANAFLORO finds itself at a crossroads, where
it is no longer possible to conceal the distance between the
discourse and practice of government agencies. In this
regard, if the relevant government agencies cannot
collectively demonstrate a real commitment to the successful
implementation of the program, PLANAFLORO (as a mere source
of external funding for State bureaucracies) ceases to have a
reason to exist.
At present, the NGO Forum of Rondonia finds itself in a
difficult position. On one hand, the non-governmental
organizations want to contribute to PLANAFLORO, given its
potential importance for small farmers, rubber-tappers,
indigenous communities and other sectors of the local
population (and its general significance as an attempt to
promote a new model of sustainable development).
On the other hand, we have observed a systematic
"emptying" of the spaces for NGO participation in PLANAFLORO
(sectoral planning commissions (CNPs), State Deliberative
Council, etc.). In this regard, it has become evident that
the official participation of NGOs in PLANAFLORO is only
serving to legitimize an influx of financial resources into
government bureaucracies, without an effective social control
over the use of those resources.
One of the instruments available to NGOs to correct
distortions in the implementation of PLANAFLORO should be the
Independent Evaluation Committee (COMAI). However, the
process of project evaluation has been prejudiced by a severe
lack of logistical support, attempts at political
intervention and an alarming lack of interest, on the part of
the Government of Rondonia, to incorporate the proposals made
in the first evaluation report of PLANAFLORO.
Another instrument to guarantee "quality control" in the
implementation of PLANAFLORO should be the World Bank itself.
Notwithstanding the initiatives of some staff members, the
World Bank, generally speaking, has shown a surprising lack
of concern about serious problems that have arisen in the
implementation of PLANAFLORO, even when such problems have
implied non-compliance with the project's contractual
agreements.
Given this situation, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that interests in the approval and disbursement of
World Bank loans, among government and within the Bank
itself, have taken a higher priority than needs to guarantee
the effective implementation of projects. Within the World
Bank, this phenomenon is apparently related to a "project
approval culture", as identified in a recent internal
evaluation conducted by the Bank ("Wappenhans Report").
In conclusion, considering the facts presented in this
document, which demonstrate the existence of serious problems
in the implementation of PLANAFLORO, including non-compliance
with contractual agreements, the NGO Forum of Rondonia is
calling for the suspension of disbursements by the World Bank
for the PLANAFLORO project. At the same time, the Forum is
withdrawing its official participation in the program, until
concrete measures are taken to resolve the current impasse.
Below, we present a list of emergency measures that the
NGO Forum of Rondonia considers to be a prerequisite for the
disbursement of further World Bank funds for PLANAFLORO:
Demands
A) Project Management and Popular Participation
1) A wide-ranging discussion on PLANAFLORO's management
model should be held with the NGOs, with the objective of
defining a concrete strategy for strengthening popular
participation in the in the planning, monitoring and
evaluation of project activities.
2) The current planning system of PLANAFLORO, based on
superficial discussions of POAs (Annual Operating Plans),
should be reevaluated. A new methodology for strategic
planning should be defined together with the NGOs, giving
priority to: a) effective participation by PLANAFLORO's
beneficiaries, at a local level, in the elaboration of
proposals and projects; b) analysis of needs to make
government policies compatible with the socio-economic and
ecological zoning plan and PLANAFLORO's conceptual framework
of sustainable development; c) needs for training of human
resources, at the level of government agencies and
participating NGOs; d) measures to guarantee the
institutional sustainability of project activities program,
particularly after completion of PLANAFLORO.
3) The proposal originally agreed upon with the NGO
Forum of Rondonia, to promote seminars on the major themes of
PLANAFLORO, should be implemented, with the aim of improving
the technical level of project activities and broadening
discussions on the program within civil society (see Annex
02)
4) Logistical support should be secured to guarantee the
participation of NGOs (principally from the interior of the
State) in PLANAFLORO meetings (CNPs, State Deliberative
Council, etc.). In addition, a timetable of meetings should
be mutually defined well in advance.
5) A new methodology for monitoring should be defined,
in conjunction with NGOs, to allow a consistent accompaniment
of project implementation. Monitoring should allow for active
participation by NGOs, especially those organizations that
represent beneficiaries of the program at a local level. In
addition, monitoring reports should be regularly discussed in
the meetings of PLANAFLORO's sectoral planning commissions
(CNPs) and Deliberative Council.
6) Within the administrative component of PLANAFLORO,
provisions should be made to hire an analyst in public
finance and budget administration, nominated by the NGO Forum
of Rondonia, to periodically carry out an independent
analysis of PLANAFLORO expenditures.
7) Mechanisms should be introduced within the Special
Commission for Bidding of Public Works and Services (CELOM),
to make possible effective NGO monitoring of contract
bidding, making these procedures more transparent.(12)
8) There should be ample discussion between UNDP and
NGOs regarding the technical cooperation program for
PLANAFLORO, including needs for specialized consultants,
training, technical support for the activities of the
sectoral planning commissions (CNPs), etc.
B) Land Tenure Policy and the State Zoning Plan
1) The methodology for implementing studies for the
second approximation of the socio-economic and ecological
zoning should be redefined, in conjunction with NGOs, taking
into account the problems identified in the Independent
Evaluation Committee's report. The studies to be conducted
should consider the characteristics and needs of specific
areas (for example, settlement projects, Extractive Reserves,
conservation units, Indigenous Areas, etc.).
2) Priority should be given to defining a strategy for
agrarian reorganization within zones 1 and 2 of the state
zoning plan, allocating to landless agricultural workers
areas with good agricultural potential that are currently
abandoned, underutilized or irregularly transferred to
private parties. Such an initiative, in addition to its
immediate social usefulness in settling thousands of landless
peasant families, would also have the effect of reducing
demographic pressures on zones 4, 5 and 6 (areas of
environmental conservation and protection).
In this regard, studies for the second approximation of
the state zoning plan should prioritize the identification of
soils with the higher agricultural potential within zones 1
and 2, that are currently underutilized or abandoned. As a
complementary measure, administrative and legal measures
should be taken to discourage the concentration of land
within zones 1 and 2, particularly within small-farmer
settlement projects. Moreover, the viability of implementing
land reform measures in areas with more fertile soils should
be examined, including instruments such as FUNDAGRARIO (State
Law no. 214 of December 30, 1988 and Decree no. 4147 of April
21, 1989).
3) The State Socio-Economic-Ecological Zoning Commission
should be recognized as a legitimate forum to deliberate on
matters related to the state zoning plan (for example, the
terms of reference of the second zoning survey, etc.). The
participation of the NGOs in this commission should be
extended.
4) As a parallel measure, the State Socio-Economic and
Ecological Zoning Commission should be strengthened,
especially in terms of its technical capacity. Procedures
should be urgently defined to guarantee that future
alterations to the state zoning plan be based on technical
criteria, making it more difficult for undue political
interventions to occur. There should be mutual agreement on
a strategy to broaden NGO participation on the Commission.
5) Priority should given to the carrying out of field
surveys in areas where conflicts are occurring in relation to
the first version of the socio-economic and ecological zoning
plan (for example: RO-429, Sao Pedro, PA Buriti region, RO-
421) taking into account both legitimate social needs and
environmental concerns.
6) A highly qualified consultant, specialized in
environmental and agrarian law, should be immediately hired
to help overcome the various legal problems identified in
this document.
7) Decree 6.316 of March 02, 1994, promulgated
irregularly by the Executive Branch, should be revoked.
Simultaneously, a new decree should be elaborated for
regulating Complementary Law no. 52, contemplating the
technical and legal requirements necessary for effective
implementation of the state zoning plan.
8) The effective cooperation of INCRA in activities
related to land tenure should be formalized along the lines
stipulated in PLANAFLORO's contractual agreements. At the
same time, guidelines and institutional responsibilities
(ITERON, INCRA) should be defined with regard to land tenure
policies and procedures, addressing such issues as: criteria
for land acquisitions and creation of settlement projects;
land tenure actions within zones 1 and 2; criteria for
granting land titles on public lands and establishment of
conservation units. In this regard, the measures agreed upon
between representatives of the NGO Forum of Rondonia and the
President of INCRA, in the document signed on March 16, 1994,
should be implemented (Annex 4).
9) INCRA's Normative Instruction no. 03 of September 8,
1992, (which recognizes deforestation and the introduction of
artificial cattle pasture as "improvements" for the purpose
of legitimizing land claims) should be repealed and
substituted by a normative instrument based on social and
environmental concepts of sustainable development.
10) INCRA should definitively cancel the Curupira, Rio
do Conto and Agua Azul Settlement Projects, created in March
1992 in disregard to the state zoning plan. Titles should be
granted only to bonafide farmers with previous land
occupations.
C. Conservation Units
1) Legal and institutional procedures should be defined
to guarantee the effective implementation of state
conservation units (including definition of their respective
legal categories). This task should be carried out with the
collaboration of specialized legal consultants, and in
consultation with the environmental planning commission (CNP)
of PLANAFLORO and the State Zoning Commission.
2) An emergency plan for the creation and implementation
of conservation units during 1994 should be defined in
conjunction with NGOs, taking into consideration needs for
land regularization, demarcation, sign posting, management
plans, protection and enforcement, etc..
3) Guidelines on the creation, implementation,
management and development of Extractive Reserves should be
elaborated in detail, under the coordination of OSR
(Organization of Rubber-Tappers of Rondonia). In this
process, the documents produced by the seminar held in
September 1993 on "Concepts of Sustainable Development in
Extractive Areas" should be utilized.
4) Extractive Reserves should be immediately created in
areas where socio-economic and land tenure studies were
carried out, and where OSR and the National Rubber-Tappers
Council (CNS) are presenting formal proposals to this end.
5) The irregular demarcations contracted by ITERON, as
described in this document, should be immediately suspended.
Contracts for the demarcation of conservation units should
only be awarded after taking the legal and institutional
measures necessary to guarantee their effective creation and
implementation.
6) ITERON and the Government of Rondonia should respect
the Federal Constitution (article 225) and other
environmental legislation that prohibit the alteration or
suppression of conservation units, without the appropriate
authorization by the Legislative Branch and approval by the
State Zoning Commission.
D. Environmental Licensing and Protection
1) The current policies and instruments of environmental
licensing should be redefined, in conjunction with NGOs, with
the goal of promoting their integration with the socio-
economic and ecological zoning plan and basic concepts of
sustainable development. Authorizations for deforestation,
selective-felling and forest management plans should respect
the state zoning regulations and conservation units, and
include legal requirements for demonstration of formal land
ownership and field inspections.
2) Activities in environmental protection and
enforcement actions should be intensified, especially in
legally-protected areas and others that are suffering
pressures from loggers, land speculators and others. The
autonomy of the permanent committee responsible for
enforcement activities should be strengthened, with further
technical support from a legal team that should include
representation from the NGO Forum of Rondonia.
3) Updated remote sensing images should be better
utilized in educational activities and for purposes of
environmental licensing and enforcement. In this regard,
training courses should be implemented for field personnel of
environmental agencies, regarding use of remote sensing
imagery, environmental legislation, etc.
4) A strategy should be defined to guarantee an
effective role for the State Public Ministry (Ministe'rio
Publico Estadual), in environmental protection, working in
collaboration with the Federal Public Ministry, government
environmental agencies and organized civil society.
5) A solution must be found for the current impasse
between IBAMA, SEDAM and the Forestry Battalion of the
Military Police that has prevented the signing of the
cooperative agreement envisaged within PLANAFLORO, therefore
rendering environmental protection and enforcement activities
in Rondonia practically impossible.
E. Indigenous Communities
1) The demarcation of five indigenous areas (Sagarana,
Rio Guapore', Rio Mequens, Karipuna and Massaco), as planned
within PLANAFLORO, should be carried out immediately. Needed
actions in land tenure regularization (as in the case of the
Uru-eu-wau-wau reserve); and boundary renewal should also be
implemented.
2) Emergency actions should be taken with regard to
enforcement and removal of invaders, principally in the
indigenous areas of Mequens, Uru-eu-wau-wau, Rio Branco and
Karipuna.
3) Support should be secured for the proper functioning
of the team responsible for isolated Indians. In addition,
the territory occupied by isolated Indians, in the region of
Rio Jaci'-Parana, between the RO-421 road and Gleba
Buriti',should be immediately interdicted, because of threats
posed by logging companies, land speculators and other
invaders.
4) A detailed health program for Rondonia's indigenous
communities should be prepared, prior to the hiring of
personnel.
5) The preparation of economic projects should include
the collaboration of experienced professionals with knowledge
of local indigenous cultures, working together with local
communities. In addition, a special commission should be
created, with participation of the NGO Forum of Rondonia, to
examine proposals submitted for funding through PLANAFLORO.
F. Agroforestry Development
1) A strategy should be defined, in conjunction with the
major small-farmer organizations in Rondonia, to guarantee
their effective participation in all stages of planning,
implementation and monitoring of PLANAFLORO activities.
2) Current agriculture policies of the Rondonia
Government especially the program for "Strategic Poles For
Agricultural, Livestock and Forestry Production", should be
reconsidered. A state policy for agroforestry development
should be defined in conjunction with organized civil
society, contemplating the integrated management of renewable
natural resources, agroecological sustainability, subsistence
production needs and the economic viability of commercial
products.
Such a comprehensive policy for agroforestry development
should serve as the basis for integrating activities of
research, technical assistance, input supply and rural
credit.
3) In this context, various rural credit lines (FNO,
FUNDAGRI, FUNDAGRO, PROCERA) need to be made compatible with
the guidelines of PLANAFLORO and the conceptual framework of
sustainable development. A technical committee should be
established, with participation of representatives from the
NGO Forum of Rondonia, to deliberate on projects submitted
for financing through FUNDAGRO.
4) Effective measures must be taken within PLANAFLORO to
promote reforestation practices, including activities in
research, rural extension, input supply and rural credit.
Priority should be given to reforestation of degraded areas
and agricultural intensification within zones 1 and 2, based
on agroforestry systems. A review of the current taxation
policy of IBAMA in the forestry sector should be carried out,
with a view towards encouraging reforestation activities.
G. Socio-Economic Infrastructure
1) The monitoring reports of PLANAFLORO should include
detailed information on the location of roads constructed and
rehabilitated by the Rondonia Highway Department (DER-RO).
The presentation and approval by the State Deliberative
Council of a State Road Plan should be a prerequisite for
further disbursements of PLANAFLORO funds for road transport.
2) ELETRONORTE should clarify its plans in relation to
the construction of the Ji-Parana Hydroelectric Project. A
public hearing should be held to analyze the Environmental
Impact Study prepared for the project, including a discussion
on alternative investments in the energy sector, based on
cost-benefit analysis and an evaluation of social and
environmental impacts.
3) With regard to the health and education sub-
components of PLANAFLORO, the proposals included in the
preliminary evaluation report by COMAI should be adopted.
H. Independent Evaluation Committee (COMAI)
1) Logistical support should be guaranteed to ensure
completion of the final report by the Independent Evaluation
Committee (COMAI), as well as the organization of the planned
seminar to discuss its results. Moreover, the proposals made
in the COMAI report should be submitted to the Deliberative
Council of PLANAFLORO with a view to their formal adoption as
resolutions.
2) The composition of COMAI should be reconsidered,
given the importance of its independent character, as well as
needs for logistical support to ensure its proper
functioning.
Sincerely,
Luis Rodrigues de Oliveira Ivaneide Bandeira Cardoso
Executive Secretary Indigenous Commission of the
Forum
Brent Millikan Jose' Maria dos Santos
Environmental Commission of Extractive Commission of the
Forum
the Forum
Joaquim Pereira Carvalho Gilvandro Pinheiro
Agricultural Commission of Urban Commission of the Forum
the Forum
With copies to:
President of the Republic
Governor of Rondonia
Executive Secretariat of PLANAFLORO
Legislative Assembly of Rondonia
Ministry of the Environment and the Legal Amazon
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Regional Integration
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
Secretariat of International Affairs (SEAIN/SEPLAN-PR)
Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources (IBAMA)
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform
(INCRA)
Commission for the Defense of Consumers, Environment and
Minorities (Chamber of Deputies, Brazilian Congress)
Federal Commission on Ecological and Economic Zoning
FOOTNOTES (numbers within text in parentheses)
1) The four government agencies that officially participated
in the Independent Evaluation Committee of PLANAFLORO
included: the Secretariat for International
Affairs/Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency of the
Republic; the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform (MARA);
the Ministry of the Environment and the Legal Amazon (MAA)
and the Ministry of Regional Integration (MIR). The four
participating NGOs included: the Federation of Agricultural
Workers in Rondonia (FETAGRO); the Rondonia Rubber Tappers'
Organization (OSR); the Brazilian Amazonia Indigenous
Organizations' Coordination (COIAB) and the Worldwide Fund
for Nature (WWF/Brazil).
2) A single seminar was held in September 1993 on "Concepts
of Sustainable Development in Extractive Areas". However, the
results of the seminar were not incorporated into the
"Extractive Reserves" sub-component of PLANAFLORO.
3) According to the Staff Appraisal Report for
PLANAFLORO,(Report no. 8073-BR, pp.16-17), these
institutional reforms would include:
a) the institutionalization of the state zoning plan;
b) The elimination of deforestation as a criterion for
obtaining land title, the adoption of suitable land
regularization policies and practices, and the establishment
of a state land institute to develop and administer land
policy in accordance with the zoning plan;
c) elimination of economic and fiscal incentives that
encourage inefficient resource allocation; non-sustainable
private investment and environmental degradation;
d) revision of state and federal investment programs, so
as to better reflect land use capabilities and other
environmental considerations, with the state zoning plan
disciplining all future Government investment decisions in
the State.
4) The creation of settlement projects in the vicinity of
indigenous areas has deliberately served to facilitate
illegal logging in these protected areas. A recent example
of this practice was the creation by INCRA of the Colina
Verde Settlement Project in 1990, adjacent to the Uru-eu-wau-
wau indigenous reserve.
5) It should be noted that the Regional Superintendent of
INCRA in Rondonia has manifested in writing, in a letter to
the President of INCRA, his position that it is not necessary
to respect the socio-economic and ecological zoning plan
because "the State Government has enacted legislation on
Federal lands, which is unconstitutional" (Oficio INCRA/SR-
17/G/No.133/94 de 17/03/94, p.4)
In fact, the above statement by the Regional
Superintendent of INCRA is mistaken from a legal point of
view. In articles 23 and 24 of the Federal Constitution,
joint fields of jurisdiction were established between the
Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities to
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